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Public International Law
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ICJ, Israel, Kosovo, Palestine
The year 2009 saw a renewed push, albeit a stunted one, for Palestinian statehood. Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad gained considerable attention in the West for his plan to oversee construction of state infrastructure from the ground up, and for his announcement that this would lead to a declaration of independence within two years. There has been notable progress, with significant growth both in the Palestinian economy and its governmental and security infrastructure. Given the current political climate in Israel, however, it seems unlikely that a bilateral peace agreement will be reached by Fayyad’s deadline. If negotiations don’t yield the results the Palestinian Authority (PA) is seeking, will it take the bold move of declaring statehood unilaterally? The Palestinians tried this gambit before, unsuccessfully, in the pre-PA days.
The success or failure of such a move largely hinges on the international community’s (and in particular, a few key players’) willingness to recognize Palestinian sovereignty against Israel’s wishes. To gain recognition as a member of the United Nations, it would require the support of at least 96 countries including all permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC).
A number of analysts have already noted similarities between the case of Palestine and that of Kosovo, which unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia two years ago next week. Though remaining nominally under UN administration under the terms of UNSC Resolution 1244, to date Kosovo’s independence has been recognized by 63 countries, including the United States and many European countries. Its status remains uncertain however, and due to opposition from Russia and China it has little hope of becoming a UN member-state.
In response to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Serbia has called on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to rule on the legality of this move. The effects of the ICJ’s advisory opinion, which is expected later this year, are not likely to change things on the ground; where it may have an effect is to influence the international community’s willingness to accept Kosovo’s sovereignty, potentially leading to greater legitimacy and UN membership.
Recognizing the implications of the decision, both sides have vested themselves seriously in the proceedings. Serbia has argued that Kosovo’s independence violates Serbia’s territorial integrity and the terms of Resolution 1244. Kosovo has argued, inter alia, that Resolution 1244 never envisioned a return to full Serbian sovereignty and that the history of violent persecution of Albanians by Serbs, which came to a horrific peak under Slobodan Milosevic, justifies its claim to self-determination on the grounds of protecting the human rights and civil rights of a minority group. This argument is somewhat tenuous, as it could potentially open the door to dozens of other separatist groups seeking independence and implicitly offer legal recognition to those who would seek to achieve nationalist goals by fostering ethnic violence. I would not venture to speculate yet as to the decision of the court, but as the first case of secession to be decided by the ICJ it is sure to have implications for other separatist groups, including the Palestinians.
If the ICJ determines Kosovo’s secession to be legal, it seems likely that a Palestinian declaration of independence will closely follow suit. The two cases bear many similarities: both have been marked by decades of ethnic conflict and persecution, both saw a disenfranchised ethnic group pushing for autonomy in a territory that historically was shared but where it currently constitutes a majority, both are areas of particular concern for the international community, both Serbia and Israel have symbolic nationalist reasons for wanting to hold onto their breakaway territories, and both conflicts have so far proven irresolvable without an imposed or unilateral solution.
Moreover, thanks to Fayyad and those who came before him, the Palestinians already have the benefit of numerous state or quasi-state institutions, and far broader international support than Kosovo does. When the PLO previously declared Palestinian statehood in 1988, the state of Palestine was recognized by close to 100 countries. Today, the number would be much higher, particularly as many European countries have recently expressed a readiness to accept a unilateral Palestinian declaration of independence. Moreover, unlike in 1988, today all major powers – including the United States – have expressed their commitment in principle to a Palestinian state.
Such a state is most probably going to emerge, one way or another. Regardless of the ICJ’s decision on Kosovo, it is unlikely that the Palestinians will wait forever for a peace agreement with Israel. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and others have long been seeking a more prominent role for international institutions, and particularly the ICJ, in their standoff with Israel, and a favourable ruling in this case will certainly bolster their position.
I’m not sure I would define the West Bank and Gaza as “breakaway territories”, although I understand nationalist reasons exist as to why Israel would want to hold onto these lands. Unlike with Serbia and Kosovo, Israel dismembered its settlements in Gaza and unilaterally withdrew from Gaza a few years ago. This signals that Israel does not harbour any desire to populate any areas of Gaza. The West Bank is a different ball park, and obviously we will have to see some population movement there before any declarations, unilateral or otherwise, can take place.
Serbian nationalists have held their ground in Kosovo and do not seem to have any ambitions to leave. The strength of a Kosovar nation will rest in large part upon the desire of its neighbour Albania, to help it. I have not seen any serious English language analysis of the relationship between Albania and Kosovo.
By way of explanation, while I realize that it may sound silly today to talk of Palestine as a “breakaway territory” from Israel, I think it does make sense in a historical context. The historic narratives of both the Israelis and the Palestinians treat Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza as a single territorial unit, and this is still evidenced in many ways in contemporary Israeli and Palestinian culture.
While proposals to divide the land have been floated for the last 80 or so years, I don’t think that prior to the Gaza withdrawal either side made serious, credible moves to recognize the territories as separate (with the arguable exception of Oslo). Unilateral Israeli action can only go so far, however; I think that progress toward a Palestinian state can only come from a Palestinian push to “break away” from Israel.
Your point about support from Albania is well-taken. Again here, I think that parallels can be drawn to Palestine.
I think it is important to note that there is a very important difference between Palestine and Kosovo, and that is the (interim) UN administration of Kosovo after the NATO intervention in 1999. It is pretty hard to predict the exact legal effect this has, but it should be anticipated that in case the ICJ rules “in favour” of Kosovo’s independence (which is highly doubtful especially in light of the subject matter of the case) the UN administration will be an important part of the Court’s legal reasoning.