Madrid 1 – Barcelona 0 : Spain’s Constitutional Court stops Catalonian Nationalist Ambitions

The last few decades of European integration have challenged and re-conceptualized the traditional role of nation-states on the European continent. The end of totalitarian dictatorship coupled with the emergence of democracy spurred secessionist movements in various European countries, notably Spain, the former Yugoslavia and other East European countries where large minorities were stuck on what they saw as the wrong side of the post-Soviet state borders. Spain is a particularly interesting case because of the severe repression of Basque and Catalan nationalists during the Franco regime, but also due to the popularity of the EU, particularly in autonomous regions that see the supra-national entity as an alternative to the unpopular nation-state.

This article focuses on the Catalonian plight for greater autonomy and self-government and recent rebukes to the nationalist goal of full independence from Spain. On June 28^th 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled on the Catalan Statute that had tried to define the scope of self-government in the region. The Court had deliberated for four years after a challenge by the main opposition People’s Party (PP) and several Spanish regions to a reform proposal of the Statute of Autonomy passed in 2005 by the Catalan Parliament and ratified by Catalans in a referendum in June 2006. Controversy erupted this summer when the Court invalidated fourteen articles. The Court went on to provide an interpretative reading of twenty-seven other articles, and rejected the definition of Catalonia as a ‘nation’ in the preamble.

Spain’s highest court first rejected the controversial use of the word ‘nation’ and re-affirmed the singularity of the Spanish nation in Spain. Cultural symbols like the flag or anthem of Catalonia are therefore considered to have no juridical value and only point to a Catalonia ‘nationality’ within the indivisible unity of the Spanish nation. Another important rejection was the Catalonian statute article that had fostered an independent judiciary, the Court affirming that only Madrid could de-centralize its own judicial system. The Court not only rejected as unconstitutional the Statute’s elevation of the Catalan language to official status, but also asserted the need for Spanish to have the same status as Catalan in the media and educational system in Catalonia. The Constitutional Court also rejected attempts to legally anchor the percentage of funding Catalonia should receive from the central government, and also clarified and affirmed that self-government derived from the Spanish constitution and that this autonomy was not enshrined as legal right. The majority opinion – six judges versus four on the minority – did leave untouched nearly 95% of the Statute, but its tackling of highly sensitive and important aspects of the structure of power in Spain created the expected backlash.

The political fall-out in Catalonia was immediate and strong. Around a million Catalans attending a rally in Barcelona on July 10^th, although regional elections in late November should give the clearest indication yet as to the repercussions from the Catalonian electorate. More importantly, the PP’s insurmountable lead in national polls that should lead to a seizure of power within the next two years will surely further test the uncomfortable and delicate balance between the centralizing powers in Madrid and nationalist ambitions in Barcelona. The ruling Social Democrats under Prime Minister Zapatero mostly aided the de-centralization leanings of the Catalan (and Basque) regions in exchange for political support in the Spanish legislature. The PP’s ties to Franco governments and the accompanying disdain from Catalan (and Basque) nationalists, as well as its dominant role in bringing forward this Constitutional claim bodes well for future conflicts on Catalonians’ desire for greater autonomy and powers of self-government.

Unlike many of its Western allies, the Spanish government has yet to recognize Kosovo’s Declaration of independence, as doing so would surely be counter-intuitive to the preservation of its own territorial integrity. The EU’s predominant role in supporting Kosovar claims should spur Catalan nationalists to turn to Brussels for support in their quest to re-draw the status quo in Spain. However, unless European Federalists fulfil their dreams of dismantling nation-states to the benefit of a European supra-state (or other European Federal entity), the path to further autonomy and perhaps independence seems a long way off for Catalonian nationalists, especially in light of this recent Constitutional ruling as well as the upcoming takeover of power by its enemies in Madrid.

I believe that the unique Catalonian culture and history and therefore its rightful demands for autonomy must be balanced against the right to territorial integrity of a modern Spanish state. Among modern European states, nearly all stem from the (forced and/or unforced) amalgamation of territories and nations under one single construct. The EU’s predominant role in recognizing Kosovo’s declaration of independence is therefore problematic in a continent where many nations still have legitimate autonomy/independence claim. The Kosovar example can however be distinguished by their very recent experience of repression and violence, and the previous and recent disintegration of the umbrella state of Yugoslavia in persuading the EU to recognize the legitimacy of its independence claims. Without diminishing the legitimacy of their argument, the Catalan struggle for greater autonomy will therefore be a continuing political and legal battle that takes place in Madrid more than in Barcelona. Brussels will have a watchful eye over affairs, but the technocrats at the EU and other member states in Europe are loathe to intercede in the affairs of an already established and powerful EU member. Serbia probably wishes that this neutrality could apply to their own (now former) province of Kosovo.

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