A Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, signed by a group of forty eight academics from around the world, has added, “We have a shared concern for the harm done to the public welfare by the international investment regime, as currently structured, especially its hampering of the ability of governments to act for their people in response to the concerns of human development and environmental sustainability”. [2] It argues, inter alia, that investment treaty arbitrations are unfair and unbalanced,[3] and that states should withdraw from investment treaties.[4] International investment law has even been described by a distinguished academic as “a law of greed”.[5]

Although perhaps somewhat exaggerated, these critiques are certainly not baseless. Several recent developments, most notably the disputes between tobacco giant Philip-Morris and the governments of Australia and Uruguay, indeed demonstrate how foreign investors can abuse the system of international investment law. But, as previously argued in this blog,[6] it could well be that these critics overlook the possibility that this system can also support sustainable development goals.

An alternative perspective of the ‘regulatory chill’

While the above mentioned critics often claim that investment treaty law restricts governments’ regulatory flexibility and their ability to adopt stricter environmental and social laws, it should be noted that similar ‘restrictions’ can also stop governments from reducing their standards on these very issues. For example, in recent investment arbitration a Canadian investor, who invested in an eco-tourism facility in Barbados, argued that Barbados authorities’ failure to enforce environmental laws and commitments, on which he legitimately relied, led to the pollution of his site.[7] The prospect of paying compensation in such cases can ‘chill’ governments’ will to  lower environmental standards, and thus support environmental objectives.

Similar claims can also be made with respect to climate change policies. Investment in low-carbon technologies, for example, often requires governmental support. This is partly due to market distortions like those resulting from high fossil fuels subsidies.[8] Another reason is the immature state of these technologies that often renders them unprofitable in strictly financial terms. Therefore, without state support many investors may choose other, more profitable alternatives. Indeed in order to promote climate-friendly investment, many states have adopted support schemes so as to cover the existing ‘gap’ between the public need for private investment in this field, and the current unprofitability of these technologies.

Investors rely on these governmental support schemes when deciding whether to invest in new low-carbon technologies. Governments’ ability to ‘fulfill their promises’ of support is therefore crucial for investors. When these promises are not kept after an initial heavy investment has been made, investors’ discontent can be understood. Even more troubling, at least from the public’s point of view, is that ‘un-kept promises’ can also discourage investors from making similar investments in the future.[9]

In light of the above, it can be argued that (to use the Guardian’s words) the existence of such a “legal weapon that gives corporations the edge on government”, may not necessarily be a bad thing. Having the option of claiming compensation in cases of governmental ‘betrayal’ can reduce the risks of relying on governmental promises, and encourage investors to invest in low-carbon technologies.

Recent developments:

Lately this present discussion has become a reality. On November 2011 a group of fourteen foreign investors filed a notice of arbitration against the Spanish government (based on the Energy Charter Treaty), following the latter’s substantive cuts in its feed-in tariffs (“FIT”) scheme. The cut in the FIT scheme was made due to the financial hardships Spain is currently facing.[10] The exact legal arguments raised by the foreign investors in this case are unknown to the author,[11] but a legal brief prepared by a certain leading law firm suggests that they may have relied on the “fair and equitable treatment” and “national treatment” standards of protection, as well as on the protection from expropriation, as stipulated by the Energy Charter Treaty.[12]

The Spanish example, however, reveals also the other side of this story. Spain is currently facing a difficult financial crisis. The solar industry, according to several publications, received 2.6 billion Euros in subsidies in 2010 alone,[13] and it is doubtful whether a state in such a condition should be forced to allocate these amounts to, of all things, renewable energy.

On the other hand, it is also discouraging that when facing financial difficulties, environmental causes are too often the first to be sacrificed. It can also be added that while Spain’s admittedly difficult financial situation should perhaps be considered when resolving this dispute, other, less ‘financially challenged’ states, like the UK, are making similar cuts.

In the author’s view, investment treaty law’s role in such cases is not necessarily negative. It provides assurances that in light of the low priority environmental considerations often receive, especially in times of financial turbulence, environmental ‘promises’ may still be respected. This is important for the prospect of green technologies, and for the future of our planet. This, however, is not to say that the system is flawless. Struggling states such as Spain should be allowed some flexibility when facing economic crises. And as demonstrated by several investment awards decided in the past against Argentina, it is possible that many investment treaties are simply not suitable for dealing with these situations. But, and this is important to remember, the arbitrations against Argentina and the mentioned case against Spain involve financial crises of historical proportions. This may not, usually, be the typical case in future claims.

Conclusion:

The prospects for the UN ‘green-economy’ vision depends on the successful fusion between private commercial interests and public environmental and social goals. Providing the private sector with the ability to efficiently claim compensation from states that do not live up to their environmental commitments, does not conflict with this vision. This is especially true in the case of low-carbon technologies, in which the private sector’s involvement is crucial.

Those criticizing the investment regime should continue to do so. This system, like many others, is not perfect. At the same time the benefits of this system should not be overlooked, especially when the voices calling for its revision grow ever-louder.

[2] Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, 31 August 2010, online: Osgood <http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/documents/Public%20Statement.pdf> [Public Statement].

[3] Public Statement, supra note 10 at para 8.  These critiques mostly claim that investment treaties represent only the commercial interests of foreign investors, and ignore public interests of states.

[4] Public Statement, supra note 10 at para 14.

[5] M. Sornarajah, ‘A Law for Need or a Law for Greed?: Restoring the Lost Law in the International

Law of Foreign Investment’, Int. Environ. Agreements 123 (2006): 329 [Sornarajah, ‘A Law for Need or a Law for Greed?] at 331.

[6] “Environmental exceptions in the future EU investment policy. Perhaps more than meets the eye?”, Legal Frontiers, June 10.

[7] Peter A. Allard v. The Government of Barbados, (Notice of Dispute) 8 September, 2009 online: Graemehall <http://graemehall.com/legal/papers/BIT-Complaint.pdf> [Allard].

[8] Ben Sills, “Fossil Fuel Subsidies Six Times More Than Renewable Energy”,  Bloomberg, 9 November 2011, online: Bloomberg <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-09/fossil-fuels-got-more-aid-than-clean-energy-iea.html>.

[9] In a statement made by the UK Solar Trade Association following the U.K. government’s decision to modify its FIT scheme it was argued: “Such deep cuts to the tariff would kill the UK solar industry stone dead.” The UK Renewable Energy Association has added: “The renewables industry is really not confident at all. These changes undermine confidence across all energy-related investments, even CCS [carbon capture and storage] and nuclear, as we need to be confident that the government will honour their commitments and not chop and change.” See Uk Parliament Briefing Paper, Elena Ares, Oliver Hawkins and Paul Bolton, Science and Environmental Section, “Feed-in Tariffs: Solar PV”, online: UK Parliament <www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06112.pdf> at 14, and Damian Carrington, Feed-in tariff cuts ‘will kill solar industry stone dead’”, The Guardian, 31 October 2011, online: The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/oct/31/feed-in-tariff-cuts-industry>.

[10] Tim Webb, “Spain’s financial crisis claims another victim: the solar power industry” The Guardian, 30 March 2011, online: The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/30/new-europe-spain-solar-power>. Please note that other states, like the U.K., have also modified their FIT schemes for similar reasons. In the U.K. these measures were legally challenged (successfully, for the moment) by solar industry. See Energy Efficiency News, “High court rules UK government’s solar feed-in-tariff cuts are illegal”, 22 December, 2011, Energy Efficiency News, online: <http://www.energyefficiencynews.com/i/4745/>.

[11] To the best of the author’s knowledge, these have not been published yet.

[12] See a brief prepared by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, “Tariff changes for photovoltaic solar power in Spain” March 2011, online: <http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2011/mar11/29871.pdf>.

[13] Tim Webb, “Spain’s financial crisis claims another victim: the solar power industry” The Guardian, 30 March 2011, online: The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/30/new-europe-spain-solar-power>.

L’accès aux ARV est donc capital pour les PED, dont les populations ont les plus hauts taux d’incidence (4). Il y a près de dix ans, les ARV n’étaient que peu ou pas accessibles aux victimes de la maladie dans les PED, coûtant près de 10 000 $ par année pour chaque patient (5, 6). La société civile ainsi que certains membres de la communauté médicale internationale, outrés par l’attitude des grandes compagnies pharmaceutiques[1], ont donc dû prendre les choses en main afin de modifier l’ordre du jour politique global et  réitérer l’importance d’agir contre les ravages que cause le VIH/sida au sein des populations les plus durement touchées, notamment l’Afrique subsaharienne (7, 8). Ce sont les producteurs de médicaments génériques[2] qui sont venus changer la donne en concurrençant les grandes pharmaceutiques occidentales sur le marché des ARV dans les PED et en faisant diminuer les coûts à près de seulement 100 $ par année  par patient (5, 9).

Cependant, la communauté internationale fait maintenant face à un nouveau problème, les médicaments de première ligne, qui demeurent les plus abordables, n’étant pas toujours efficaces, le traitement du VIH/sida nécessite bien souvent un changement de stratégie dans le choix des médicaments (3). Bien que la contestation du système alors en place ait réussi à faire réduire les prix des ARV de première ligne, les prix des ARV de deuxième ligne[3] demeurent extrêmement élevés en raison des nouvelles contraintes qu’imposent de récents accords internationaux sur le droit de la propriété intellectuelle aux producteurs de génériques. Ces accords empêchent ces derniers de commercialiser des médicaments développés par les grandes pharmaceutiques.

Il est toutefois grand temps que des règles claires soient établies dans le domaine du droit international de la propriété intellectuelle afin que les PED puissent avoir accès aux ARV de deuxième ligne à un prix raisonnable et afin de favoriser la recherche, l’innovation et le développement de produits[4] adaptés aux PED[5]. En effet, l’ampleur de la catastrophe humaine qui a présentement lieu en Afrique ainsi que dans d’autres PED impose que la communauté internationale agisse et que les multinationales pharmaceutiques, jusqu’alors très peu prêtes à aider leur prochain, reconnaissent qu’un devoir humanitaire leur incombe. Dans ce travail, je présenterai le régime actuel du droit international de la propriété intellectuelle et son effet sur l’accès aux ARV pour les PED. Je présenterai finalement des pistes de solution.

Accords internationaux sur le droit de la propriété intellectuelle et des brevets

Tous les pays désirant adhérer à l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC)[6], doivent signer et ratifier l’Accord sur les aspects des droits de propriété intellectuelle qui touchent au commerce (ADPIC) (11). L’ADPIC impose aux pays membres une réforme de leur droit interne de la propriété intellectuelle et donc l’imputabilité judiciaire pour le non respect du droit des brevets (art. 27 et 28 ADPIC). Le but premier de la mise en place de ce régime est de favoriser  l’investissement dans la recherche et le développement de produits en garantissant un monopole sur la commercialisation du produit au détenteur du brevet[7] (9). Heureusement, la communauté internationale a pris soin de ménager certaines exceptions à l’application de ces règles en prévoyant une issue de secours et le non respect de brevets, autrement en vigueur, en cas d’urgence nationale extrême ou de besoin pressant pour maintenir la santé publique (art. 27 (2), 30 et 31 (b) ADPIC). Il a d’ailleurs été reconnu que le VIH/sida est une crise dans le domaine de la santé publique suffisamment urgente pour permettre à un pays désirant se servir de l’exception invoquée à l’article 31 (b) de l’ADPIC d’autoriser la production de médicaments ARV génériques (9).

D’autre part, en 2001, les pays membres de l’OMC conscients de l’aggravation de la crise du VIH/sida se sont réunis afin de clarifier l’exception prévue au régime de brevets de l’ADPIC et ont présenté la Déclaration sur l’Accord sur les ADPIC et la santé publique (Déclaration de Doha) (12). Cette déclaration, en plus de réitérer le droit d’un pays à déterminer ce qui constitue une crise menaçant la santé publique et d’accorder des licences obligatoires (art. 5 Déclaration de Doha), a changé la donne en accordant un droit de non application de l’ADPIC en matière de brevet jusqu’en 2016 aux pays les moins avancés (PMA) ainsi qu’en recommandant fortement aux pays développés de mettre en place des politiques de transfert de technologies vers les PMA dans le domaine de la santé (art. 7 Déclaration de Doha). Les pays ne possédant pas la capacité manufacturière et l’expertise nécessaire afin de produire des médicaments génériques restent laissés pour compte, mais la situation changera par la suite avec la Décision du conseil général du 30 août 2003 (13) qui permet aux pays producteurs de médicaments génériques d’exporter leurs produits au sein des pays ne possédant pas d’industrie pharmaceutique.

Ces mesures ont eu un grand succès, notamment en Thaïlande et au Brésil, et plus de 60 pays ont maintenant pu se procurer des ARV à un prix moindre en ayant recours aux exceptions de l’ADPIC (7). Toutefois, les pays occidentaux ainsi que leurs industries pharmaceutiques ont su préserver leur part de marché et trouver des manières habiles de contourner les règles. D’une part, les pays occidentaux ont exercé de fortes pressions[8] sur les PED et surtout sur les pays moyennement développés (PMD) afin qu’ils n’aient pas recours aux exceptions prévues au sein de l’ADPIC[9] et ont réussi à mettre en place des régimes de droit de la propriété intellectuelle beaucoup plus stricts et ne comportant pas les exceptions de l’ADPIC au moyen d’accords commerciaux bilatéraux et régionaux[10] (9). D’autre part, les compagnies pharmaceutiques utilisent une stratégie de la perpétuation des brevets afin d’en prolonger la durée de vie. Cette technique consiste à faire breveter un produit légèrement différent, mais comportant la même technologie ou les mêmes composés, par exemple la transformation d’un comprimé en un gel (6). À cet égard, il convient de saluer l’initiative du gouvernement indien qui a su ajuster sa législation sur la propriété intellectuelle à cette réalité en imposant des critères de brevetabilité plus stricts (9, 14).

Pistes de solution

Plusieurs options sont envisageables afin de s’assurer que les PED puissent bénéficier d’un accès aux ARV à des prix abordables et de favoriser le développement de produits adaptés à un marché qui compte près de 80 % de la population mondiale, mais n’en représente qu’environ 10 % des ventes (6). Si les pays occidentaux et leur puissante industrie pharmaceutique ont su s’adapter aux nouvelles règles du jeu, il est maintenant temps que la société civile se fasse entendre de la communauté internationale à nouveau et force les décideurs à respecter les exceptions au régime de l’ADPIC, à trouver de nouvelles solutions et à reconnaître que la vie de pans entiers de la population de certains PED est en jeu.

Tout d’abord, la société civile devrait fortement pousser la communauté internationale à reconnaître que l’accès aux ARV entre dans le cadre de la protection des droits humains à la santé et à la vie[11]. La reconnaissance d’un tel droit imposerait alors à tous les pays ainsi qu’au secteur commercial des pharmaceutiques de respecter le texte et l’esprit des exceptions prévues au sein de l’ADPIC ainsi que des deux déclarations subséquentes (9, 15-18) et de modifier la vision préétablie du droit des brevets afin de le repositionner comme un facteur de changement et d’innovation pour le bénéfice de tous (19). Les pays se verraient obliger de modifier leurs régimes légaux de protection de la propriété intellectuelle afin de prendre en compte les droits à la santé et à la vie et le caractère social des brevets. Les réformes pourraient inclure le droit de recourir à des licences obligatoires afin de se procurer des médicaments génériques ou simplement lorsque des brevets font obstacle à l’innovation en matière de santé publique[12]. Les critères de brevetabilité devraient aussi être renforcés de manière à ne récompenser d’un brevet que les produits démontrant une efficacité supérieure à un produit similaire ou étant caractérisé par une réelle innovation afin de favoriser la recherche et le développement tout en empêchant la perpétuation des brevets (6). Des principes directeurs pour les agents de l’État chargés d’accorder les brevets devraient notamment être établis et appliqués de manière similaire au niveau mondial. L’exception d’exploitation rapide, qui permet de faire homologuer un produit avant même la fin d’un brevet en utilisant les résultats des tests de la pharmaceutique qui a développé le produit si l’on démontre que notre produit est identique au produit breveté afin que la commercialisation puisse se faire dès l’expiration du brevet, devrait être intégrée aux législations nationales (6).

Les compagnies pharmaceutiques devraient aussi se voir imposer de nouvelles obligations et pourraient être forcées de ne pas déposer de brevets ou de ne pas appliquer leurs brevets existants pour les ARV dans certains pays aux prises avec le fléau qu’est devenue la problématique du VIH/sida. De plus, elles devraient avoir l’obligation de transférer leurs technologies manufacturières aux PMA (6).

Une autre option nous lance sur la piste d’une prise en charge du dossier par l’organisme onusien tout spécialement chargé de s’occuper des questions de propriété intellectuelle, l’Organisation mondiale de la propriété intellectuelle. Cet organisme devrait voir son rôle être redéfini afin de prendre en considération de manière plus représentative les besoins de tous ses membres (28) et pourrait présenter un projet de convention internationale mettant à l’avant plan un nouveau régime favorisant les PED dans le domaine de la santé publique. Ce régime pourrait introduire des intervalles de situations monopolistiques plus courtes, des conditions d’obtention plus strictes et des exceptions clairement définies et non dérogatoires pour les PED. Les PED formant la grande majorité des États membres de l’organisation, ils ont de considérables chances de faire valoir avec succès leurs revendications.

Finalement, un plus grand ralliement du secteur privé au nouveau projet présenté par UNITAID en 2009, la Communauté de brevets, qui incite les pharmaceutiques à octroyer des licences volontaires pour certains produits auxquels l’accès est primordial pour les PED (7, 10). Des chercheurs peuvent ensuite se servir de ces produits afin de développer des dérivés adaptés à la réalité des PED.

Il est grand temps que le droit des brevets retrouve ses marques de noblesse et retourne à son aspiration première de permettre à tous de bénéficier des avancées technologiques et des nouvelles découvertes. Les compagnies pharmaceutiques ainsi que les dirigeants d’aujourd’hui ont maintenant la vie de millions de personnes entre leurs mains.

Références

1. ONUSIDA. Le point sur l’épidémie de sida. [En ligne] 2009 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/report/2009/jc1700_epi_update_2009_fr.pdf

2. Tarakeshwar N, Kalichman SC, Limbayi LC, Sikkema KJ. HIV Prevention Needs : Primary Prevention and Prevention for People Living with HIV/AIDS. Dans: Celentano DD, Beyrer C, éditeurs. Public Health Aspects of HIV/AIDS in Low and Middle Income Countrie. New York: Springer; 2008. p. 19-40.

3. Hoffman CJ, Mills LA, Gallant JE. Future of HIV/AIDS Care in Low- and Middle- Income Countries. Dans: Celentano DD, Beyrer C, éditeurs. Public Health Aspects of HIV/AIDS in Low and Middle Income Countrie. New York: Springer; 2008. p. 41-69.

4. Celentano DD, Davis WW, Beyrer C. Epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in Low and Middle Income Countries: Where Global AIDS is and Where it is Going. Dans: Celentano DD, Beyrer C, éditeurs. Public Health Aspects of HIV/AIDS in Low and Middle Income Countrie. New York: Springer; 2008. p. 3-18.

5. Médecins sans frontière. Untangling the Web of Antiretroviral Price Reductions. [En ligne] 2008 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://www.utw.msfaccess.org/downloads/31

6. Organisation mondiale de la santé. Santé publique, innovation et droit de la propriété intellectuelle : Rapport de la Commission sur les droits de la propriété intellectuelle, l’innovation et la santé publique. [En ligne] 2006 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/FRPublicHealthReport.pdf

7. Hoen ET, Berger J, Calmy A, Moon S. Driving a Decade of Change : HIV/AIDS, Patents and Access to Medicines for All. J Intl AIDS Soc [Périodique en ligne] 2011 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; 14 (15). Disponible à : URL : http://www.jiasociety.org/content/14/1/15

8. Mukherjee J. HIV/AIDS Care: The Minimum Package and Scaling Up. Dans: Celentano DD, Beyrer C, éditeurs. Public Health Aspects of HIV/AIDS in Low and Middle Income Countrie. New York: Springer; 2008. p. 71-84.

9. St-Martin F. The Right to Health, the TRIPS Agreement and the Public Health Safeguards to Encourage the Universal Access to Essential Medicines. Université de Montréal: Faculté de droit; 2006.

10. UNITAID. Rapport annuel 2010. [En ligne] 2010 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://www.unitaid.eu/fr/resources/rapports-dactivites.html

11. Accord sur les aspects des droits de propriété intellectuelle qui touchent au commerce 1994 (OMC).

12. Déclaration sur l’Accord sur les ADPIC et la santé publique 2001 (OMC).

13. Décision du Conseil général du 30 août 2003 : Mise en œuvre du paragraphe 6 de la Déclaration de Doha sur l’Accord sur les ADPIC et la santé publique 2003 (OMC).

14. Millenium Project. Prescription for Healthy Development : Increasing Access to Medicines. [En ligne] 2005 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/TF5-medicines-Complete.pdf

15. Amollo R. Revisiting the TRIPS Regime : Rwanda-Canadian ARV Drug Deal “Tests” the WTO General Council Decision. Afr J Intl & Comp Law 2009; 17; p. 240-269.

16. Csete J. Several for the Price of One: Right to AIDS Treatment as Link to Other Human Rights. Conn J Intl Law 2001-2002; 17; p. 263-272.

17. Walker EM. The HIV/AIDS Pandemic: A Human Rights Approach. Flo J Intl Law 2007; 19; p. 335-419.

18. Santoro MA. Human Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral Principles Justifying Third World Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs. NC J Intl L & Com Reg 2005-2006; 31; p. 923-942.

19. Médecins sans frontière. Statement by MSF at WIPO GA September 30, 2004. [En ligne] [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://www.who.int/entity/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/MSF%20statement%20at%20WIPO%20GA%20%2030%20%20Sep%20%202004.pdf

20. Harmon A, Pear R. Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat Anthrax. The New York Times. [En ligne] 2009 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/19/business/19CANA.html?pagewanted=all

21. Médecins sans frontière. How the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Threatens Access to Medicines. [En ligne] 2011 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/2011/MSF-TPP-Issue-Brief.pdf

22. Knowledge Ecology International. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA). [En ligne] 2010 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://www.keionline.org/tpp

23. Knowledge Ecology International. Trans-Pacific Partnership : Property Rights Chapter. [En ligne] 2011 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf

24. Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme 1948 (ONU AG).

25. Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels 1976 (ONU AG).

26. Convention sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination à l’égard des femmes 1981 (ONU AG).

27. Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant 1990 (ONU AG).

28. Musungu SF, Dutfield G. Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO).  TRIPS Issues Papers. [En ligne] 2003 [cité 20 octobre 2011]; Disponible à : URL : http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/Multilateral-Agreements-in-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf

[2] Il faut mentionner l’importance des producteurs de médicaments génériques indiens qui produisent près de 80 % des ARV que l’on retrouve dans les PED (10).

[3] Les ARV de deuxième ligne sont utilisés si le patient semble avoir développé une résistance, inévitable pour certains patients, aux ARV de première ligne.

[4] Il est important de noter que le droit des brevets ne constitue pas un moyen pertinent de stimuler la recherche et le développement et d’amener de nouveaux produits sur un marché où le pouvoir d’achat est très faible, comme c’est le cas dans les pays en développement.

[5] Notamment, le développement de médicaments adaptés aux enfants et de comprimés trois-en-un à dose fixe.

[6] L’OMC défend depuis toujours très chèrement les intérêts commerciaux occidentaux.

[7] Ce monopole a une durée de 20 ans (art. 33 ADPIC).

[8] Ces moyens de pression prennent souvent la forme de sanctions financières directes ou indirectes.

[9] L’on se doit d’ailleurs de noter l’hypocrisie de ces pays qui n’hésitent pas à utiliser ces mêmes médicaments génériques dans le cadre de leurs programmes de donations, tel que le Plan d’urgence américain pour l’aide contre le sida (« PEPFAR ») (4). Dans le même ordre d’idée, notons le manque de scrupule des gouvernements américain et canadien à menacer la pharmaceutique Bayer de recourir aux exceptions de l’ADIPC afin de se procurer à moindre coût d’importantes quantités du médicament Cipro lors de la crise de l’anthrax aux États-Unis (20).

[10] On semble pouvoir retrouver un exemple flagrant de cette stratégie des pays développés afin de contourner l’esprit des exceptions aux règles de l’ADPIC au sein des négociations pour un éventuel accord de Partenariat trans-pacifique, impliquant les gouvernements des États-Unis, du Chili, du Vietnam et de plusieurs autres pays (21-23).

[11] Ces droits sont notamment reconnus au sein des textes suivants : Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme (24), Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels (25), Convention sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination à l’égard des femmes (26) et la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant (27).

[12] Le Canada a édicté une telle loi, avec un succès mitigé (15).

The most common reasons propagated for this trend include the low volume of global trade emanating from and to Africa, African countries’ inability to navigate the complicated and expensive DSS, and a lack of expert trade lawyers. Whilst these factors are accurate and helpful in explaining African absenteeism in the DSS, it is important to examine the WTO DSS itself. It is vital to consider the functioning, structure and jurisprudence of the system itself for potential failings that can assist in helping explain African countries’ minimal involvement. A key area to consider is the implication of jurisprudence on African countries despite their engagement in the DSS as primary parties. Dispute Panels and Appellant Body render significant decisions that often have a direct impact on African countries’ trade policies with little to no contribution by the very African countries that stand to gain or lose a great deal.

An example of a pivotal and far reaching Panel and Appellant Body ruling has been the India-Quantitative Restrictions (QR) on Imports of Agricultural Textile and Industrial Products case (August 1999). The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that WTO panels are competent to hear any complaints regarding measures for which a GATT Article XVIII balance-of-payments justification is evoked as a defence to a trade violation sanction. GATT Article XVIII:B is a special provision for developing countries which allows their economies that can only support “low standards of living and are in the early stages of development”, to restrict imports if they face balance-of-payments problems.

Essentially, this ruling brought – within the WTO’s dispute settlement jurisdiction – matters that should be handled by the political organs internal to the WTO. The Balance-of-Payments Committee and the General Council are two such political bodies. This decision makes this provision much less effective and thereby takes away a mechanism for developing countries to correct trade imbalances. In the long run, it weakens their position even further. The immediate implications are that countries with balance-of-payments problems  – including many African countries – have lost the opportunity to discuss this issue in a diplomatic forum such as the General Council, where development challenges could be better articulated than in the dry legalistic dispute settlement system.

This is only one example where it is clear that the WTO DSS has failed to be sensitive and accommodating to the unique situations of developing countries. In particular, the Appellant Body failed to anticipate and appreciate the long term negative effects of their ruling on African countries. This example is one of the possible reasons that helps explain African countries’ failure to take advantage of the WTO DSS.

To conclude, on one hand, the fact that the majority of WTO is made up of African countries counts for nothing until this presence is coupled with a strong understanding of the DSS mechanism. This issue is of pressing importance simply because African countries, especially the weakest of them, need the WTO DSS. As the Dispute Settlement System evolves along with International Economic Law, it will serve African countries well to get involved in reshaping new sets of legal principles and procedures that govern the system. However, on the other hand, there is clear evidence that the integration of African countries into the multi-lateral Dispute Settlement System has been a process leaving much to be desired. There is a great need for reform and sensitivity of the system that will ultimately enhance the long-term stability, predictability and legitimacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement System. A failure to reform could mean that the DSS will remain fundamentally prejudicial to the long-term position of African Countries and other developing economies in the global trading system.

Nailed it: Environment Minister Ryu Matsumoto raises the hammer to end the COP10 conference in Nagoya. KYODO PHOTO, Japan Times Sunday, Oct. 31, 2010

On Saturday morning, October 28 2010 the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted in the midst of a standing ovation by the Parties present.

This Protocol is intended to comply with the 3^rd objective of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which is the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources with the custodians of biodiversity. This Protocol is being hailed by delegates and nongovernmental organizations as one of the most important measures the world has ever taken against biopiracy.

Indeed, for many decades, pharmaceutical and cosmetics firms, and the agricultural and biotech industries have manufactured everyday products (drugs, toothpaste, makeup, etc.) consumed in our developed countries using plants or organisms from such places as the tropical rain forests of Latin America and Southeast Asia without acknowledging their origin or sharing the profits with Indigenous peoples and local communities whose knowledge made the development of these products possible[1]. Even worse, companies have patented over the last decades traditional products that were developed with the knowledge of Indigenous peoples and local communities without a mere recognition of their input in crops such as basmati rice in India, quinoa in the Andes and yellow corn in Mexico.

With stakes now running high around the economic value of ecosystems and biodiversity, such an international regime to control the access and benefit sharing (ABS) of these resources in order to stem their theft was long overdue. But an agreement between North, pressing for enhanced access to these genetic resources, and South, fighting to gain the benefits that were entitled to them after many years of biopiracy on their territory, seemed unreachable. The ghost of the Copenhagen failure last spring had many predicting failure in these difficult negotiations.

In such a context, the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol at the Tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD (COP10) last October, after six years of hard-scrabble negotiating, was seen as a victory, celebrated by many delegates and nonprofits organizations.

Yet amid the celebrations, several key questions remain, especially concerning the true custodians of biodiversity, Indigenous peoples and local communities, which were the most vulnerable party in these negotiations.

At first glance, some gains were made as the Nagoya Protocol provides that “in accordance with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as appropriate, with the aim of ensuring that traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that is held by indigenous and local communities is accessed with the prior and informed consent or approval and involvement of these indigenous and local communities, and that mutually agreed terms have been established”.

After an uphill battle, two safeguards clauses were also adopted in the Preamble of the Nagoya Protocol which are: “Noting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)” and “Affirming that nothing in this Protocol shall be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the existing rights of indigenous and local communities”.

But if one takes a closer look, these negotiations saw a lack of political will from State Parties to really protect Indigenous peoples and local communities’ rights to their genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. For example, the sections on access or benefit sharing of traditional knowledge in the Nagoya Protocol use lesser legal terms, such as “with the aim of ensuring”, “as appropriate” and “as applicable”, creating a double standard between Indigenous peoples and local communities rights and those of State parties for the sake of flexibility for implementation at the national level.

The provision “in accordance with domestic law” that is also found throughout the Protocol poses another problem where Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to genetic resources may be deemed to be contingent upon recognition by national legislation in each State[2].

Moreover, the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities have been limited to “existing” or “established” rights over their traditional knowledge and associated genetic resources which could lead to widespread dispossession and impoverishment according to Paul Joffe, a Canadian Human Rights Lawyer representing the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee) at these negociations. “Genetic resources on Indigenous lands and territories have often been used in association with traditional knowledge for countless years. Such rights are most often not ‘established’ in the sense of being defined by domestic laws, agreements or court rulings.[3]”

Canada was one of the party most reticent to see the rights of Indigenous peoples protected in a firm manner in the Nagoya Protocol as it was the only country to block reference to the UNDRIP[4]. It even was awarded a DODO Award from the CBD Alliance, a global network of civil society organizations involved in the CBD, for their unhelpful behavior in ABS, particularly in relation to Indigenous peoples’ Rights. The Awards, named after the Dodo Bird — the quintessential symbol of biodiversity loss — signify governments’ failure to evolve[5].

With such lack of political will, it remains to be seen how this Protocol will be implemented at the national level. Will the worst fears of Indigenous peoples and local communities be realized or will their rights as holders and owners of much of the world’s biodiversity and traditional knowledge be really protected? We owe as consumers in the North a great deal to the traditional knowledge of Indigenous peoples and local communities and it remains to be seen if they will be repaid in a fair and equitable manner.

This Protocol thus has a long way to go at the national level before it deserves a standing ovation and praises from the international community. The Canadian government in particular needs to be watched as it is starting engagement sessions on their own national policy on ABS.

[2] Press Release: Quebec Native Women, Misinformation and Betrayal by Canada Undermining Biodiversity Negotiations, October 2010.

[3] Press Release: Quebec Native Women, Canada Accepts Reference to UN Declaration – And Continues to Undermine It, October 2010.

[4] See, Press Release: Quebec Native Women, Indigenous Representatives Denounce Canada Obstructionnist Position at COP10, October 21 2010.

[5] Press Release: CBD Alliance, ‘Dodo Awards’ presented to Governments at the Convention on Biological Diversity: The EU and Canada lead the way … to extinction, October 25 2010.

This past summer, the IRS took serious steps in an international attempt to cut down on tax evasion through the use of offshore accounts in Switzerland. The IRS has entered into an agreement with the Swiss Parliament to release over 4,000 names of U.S. citizen clients of UBS AG with significant holdings in Switzerland.

The trouble began when the IRS decided to investigate UBS for helping Americans evade US taxes.  UBS was facing potential criminal prosecution, which could have threatened the very existence of one of the largest and well-reputed banks of our time.  In a move to save the bank, UBS executives pressured the Swiss government for ways around the secrecy banking laws to give the IRS the names it wanted.

And thus commenced a potentially colossal conflict of laws battle between the Swiss and the Americans.  The Swiss have always been extremely protective of private information, regulating banking secrecy through banking laws, criminal laws, civil laws and other professional codes.[1]

Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Federal Act 1934 codifies the banker’s responsibility to protect client information, and imposes potential criminal sanctions for violations.

Article 47 states:

Any person who willfully . . . (b) in his capacity as organ, officer or employee of a bank, as auditor or assistant auditor, as member of the Banking Commission, officer or employee of its secretarial office, violates his duty to observe silence or the professional secrecy, or whoever induces or attempts to induce a person to commit such an offense, shall be fined not more than twenty thousand francs, and/or shall be imprisoned for not longer than six months. . . . If the offender acted negligently, the penalty is a fine of not more than ten thousand francs.

Thus, on its face, handing over information on bank account holders would infringe upon these codified duties.  Moreover, the Swiss Criminal Code, in art. 273. states:

Whoever makes accessible a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign official, agency, or to a foreign organization or private enterprise or to any agents of the same, shall be punished by imprisonment and in serious cases by penitentiary. In addition to that penalty, a fine may be imposed.

As we see, privacy is taken very seriously.  While Swiss banks are authorized to turn over some client information to Swiss regulators in very specific, legislated circumstances, there is no general authority to divulge secrets to foreign authorities.  Foreign authorities requesting information will need a judicial declaration to gain access to the information, and must use diplomatic channels established through treaties to do so.  Consequently, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court in Bern held in Feb 2009 that UBS violated Swiss banking law when it turned over 255 bank clients to the IRS.  However, the new agreement with Switzerland has put some of these questions to rest – at least for now.

Preceding the new agreement is a bilateral double taxation treaty between Switzerland and the USA.  The new UBS Agreement is seen as another step in this direction — not just as a private agreement concerning UBS, but rather another tax treaty which is more specific and empowering than the previous bilateral double taxation convention.  Whereas the Swiss had a duty under the general double taxation convention to provide the US assistance in cases of tax fraud, under the UBS Agreement, those obligations are extended to include assistance in cases of continued and serious tax evasion as well.

This is a significant change. Previously, many requests for bank account information by the IRS had been denied.  The basis for rejection largely stemmed from differences in Swiss and American tax law.  In the USA, tax evasion can be charged either civilly or criminally.  Under Swiss law, it is only a civil violation.  Consequently, the Swiss would only disclose information where a violation would be criminal under Swiss law, and not for mere instances of tax evasion.  (Bondi, 5-6)

While Switzerland has been able to temporarily legislate around the privacy conflict and the IRS’s imposing criminal and civil threats to UBS, the question remains: what will happen to Switzerland’s staunch commitment to privacy, particularly in the area of private finance?  To what extent should the USA be able to interfere with the domestic laws of foreign jurisdictions?  While many speak of the end of the heydays of American hegemony, this encounter with the IRS demonstrates that, at least for now, the USA – and the IRS in particular – still retain powerful influence over other countries, largely due to the economic weight of Americans in multinational institutions like UBS.

As a side note, while this development is bad news for American UBS Swiss account-holders, the potential onslaught of litigation has been keeping tax boutique firms in New York busy. While we are still weathering out the recession, bankruptcy, restructuring and now tax evasion continues to occupy lawyers.

The stated purpose of the Act was, “to ensure that corporations engaged in mining, oil or gas activities and receiving support from the Government of Canada act in a manner consistent with international environmental best practices and with Canada’s commitments to international human rights standards.” In other words, the bill hoped to codify what is currently considered, insofar as international law is concerned, to be soft law. Despite the fact that some of the biggest Multinational Enterprise (MNEs) are technologically and financially stronger than some of the countries in which they operate, they are not recognized as having international legal personality.

Several international declarations demonstrate a consensus on behalf of the majority of states that the bottom line should not be companies’ sole prerogative; human rights must also be taken into account. The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development states that the private sector, “has a duty to contribute to the evolution of equitable and sustainable communities and societies.” Similarly, OECD Guidelines, the UN Global Compact, and the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work are seen as important sources of international opinion on the duties of MNE’s. However, under international law, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is still treated as a voluntary measure that such corporations agree to undertake (whether it be for public image or morality is not significant), while positive obligations on MNE’s remain a municipal issue.

A general argument made against the Act is that it would impede business interests and would be economically disadvantageous for Canadian mining companies. Yet other countries have come forward in creating similar obligations for MNE’s. The U.K. passed the Corporate Responsibility Bill in 2003, which extends to any company with an annual turnover of at least five million pounds. The Bill appears to be much more onerous than the proposed Canadian Act, as it includes liability for Directors which could lead to imprisonment. In contrast, the Canadian Act did not include an extensive section on penalties and made no mention of liability for Directors. In fact, the three –to-four page Canadian Act looks relatively harmless compared to the twelve page U.K Bill.

Canadian mining companies have relatively recently developed quite a bad reputation abroad. It is said that in the mid-to-late 90’s, a Canadian gold mine company operating in Tanzania was involved in a cover up of 52 deaths of local farmers with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s (MIGA) Ombudsman. Just recently, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights granted precautionary measures for the members of 18 communities of the Maya indigenous people in Guatemala whom allege that mining by Montana Company, a Goldcorp subsidiary, was issued and mining began without the prior, complete, free, and informed consultation of the affected communities. Furthermore there are allegations of ongoing human rights and environmental abuses.

It was largely in response to these and similar stories that Bill C-300 was introduced. Yet, it seems that Canadian issues will take precedence over international norms. This is not surprising; in 1948, Canada was one of the last countries (along with some from the Soviet bloc) to hold out on the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, allegedly because the government was urged by lawyers and business not to sign a document that was seen as too revolutionary. At the civil society’s Convention for Biological Diversity taking place in Japan, Canada and the EU recently won the ‘Dodo award’ (named after the dodo bird). Canada was accused of blocking any real impact for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples within the ABS regime.

Thus, until international norms take the shape of positive international obligations, Canada’s approach will be the traditional one – allow for a business to ‘regulate and monitor’ itself and ensure that municipal law does not interfere.

“What does this have to do with law?” you may ask (other than its relevance to my ongoing unjust dismissal hearing). Simple: by passing the environmental buck on to financial regulatory agencies such as the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), we would be treating them just like poor old Tibor.

In the land of the incompetent, the semi-competent man is king. Similarly, in the ham-fisted world of inefficient and ineffective governmental organisations, a body which generally satisfies its mandate, such as the OSC, is a paragon. Of course, the OSC (or the rest of Canada’s financial market regulators) isn’t beyond criticism. Many complain that Canada is more lax towards fraud and white-collar crime than other countries. Nevertheless, the OSC has fared much better in meeting its dual mandate – protecting investors while promoting fair and efficient markets – than equivalent organizations in other jurisdictions, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States (particularly during the financial crisis).

It is understandable that some would want to use a relatively effective (and semi-autonomous) governmental body such as the OSC to advance important causes which are unrelated to its mandate, just because they have been neglected by more relevant organisations. Examples of such causes could include labour standards, unpopular executive decisions (see this year’s OSC ruling involving Magna International), and now environmental standards. “Tibor,” I mean “OSC,” you might say, “Environment Canada has little power to force businesses to improve their sustainability practices. Why not use corporate disclosure rules to help things along?”

Professor Dhir’s proposal, in his recent special submission to Legal Frontiers, is of course phrased differently, but the effect is largely the same. Professor Dhir argues that the OSC already has the power to require disclosure on environmental matters, and that such disclosure is of material significance to investors. He proposes that Canadian (or Ontario) law be modified to require that companies explain an absence of environmental and social policies, and assess the success of such policies.

The crucial assumption for having financial regulators enforce environmental disclosure is that it is materially relevant to investors because it corresponds with financial performance. Yet various studies have examined this link and found it to be inconclusive. For this reason, National Instrument 51-102 (which applies across Canada) requires companies only to report on “environmental policies that are fundamental to […] operations”. This is logical on its face: in some industries (such as mining or fishing) environmental policies may closely relate to financial performance, while in others (such as manufacturing musical instruments) the link may be nonexistent. Disclosure of these policies is thus only relevant to investors in the former case.

The distinction is important because as international political action on the environment – and particularly climate change – stalls, individual countries will turn to non-conventional means and organisations to achieve progress. For example, the United States has been considering using tariffs within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework to prompt action on greenhouse gas emissions. But the risk is that pulling in unrelated organisations such as the OSC or the WTO may merely confuse environmental law, reducing the impetus for a proper solution without actually achieving much.

There are many strong arguments for forcing corporations to implement environmental and social policies. But these arguments may not involve information which is materially important to investors. For this reason, it unwise to pursue action on corporate environmental responsibility within the context of a financial regulatory body tasked with protecting investors – even if progress on other fronts has been limited. Doing so is like forcing a square peg into a round hole, just because someone put gum in the square hole. Nevertheless, the temptation to do so in this case is strong, particularly since political action on the environment is so full of gum. But as Tibor could tell you, foisting the tough jobs onto someone else can only get you so far.

I only wish he hadn’t told a certain Labour Relations Board the same thing during a certain unjust dismissal hearing.

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