Posts in the category ‘Public International Law’

UN blacklist a stain on international justice

Abousfian Abdelrazik has overcome another hurdle in his long struggle for justice.

On November 30, the Montreal resident was finally removed from the United Nations Security Council 1267 List. The blacklist imposes an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo on alleged associates of Al Qaida and the Taliban.

But despite his new freedom, Abdelrazik’s fight is far from over.

Still outstanding are a $27-million lawsuit against the Canadian government, a constitutional challenge to the legislation implementing the 1267 list sanctions, and an apology from the Canadian government for its role in Abdelrazik’s almost decade-long saga that could have been written by Kafka.

Arriving in Canada as a refugee, Abdelrazik was given Canadian citizenship in 1995. He returned to Sudan, where he is a dual citizen, to visit his sick mother in 2003. There he was arrested, imprisoned, interrogated, and tortured. He was never charged with any crime and was eventually cleared by both the Sudanese government and Canada’s RCMP and CSIS of any criminal wrongdoing.

However the Canadian government refused to issue Abdelrazik a passport to return to Canada, using the 1267 List as an excuse. Abdelrazik’s name had been added to the list in 2006 at the request of the United States.

Abdelrazik spent the next 14 months sleeping on a cot in the Canadian embassy. Finally in 2009, Federal Court of Canada judge Russel…

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Netzai Sandoval, un jeune avocat mexicain, se lance contre Goliath

Un avocat de 28 ans, Netzai Sandoval, a déposé le 25 novembre une plainte à la Cour pénale internationale contre des membres du gouvernement mexicain ainsi que des cartels de la drogue. En 8 mois de travail, il a amassé de la preuve sur 470 violations du droit international, montant un dossier de 700 pages. Il a reçu les signatures de 23 000 citoyens  mexicains pour appuyer sa plainte, ce nombre ayant aujourd’hui augmenté à 27 000. Toute l’information sur la plainte est disponible sur leur blogue.

Les plaintes déposées à la CPI proviennent généralement d’États. L’avocat a ainsi présenté une plainte avec l’objectif que Luis Moreno Ocampo, le Procureur en chef de la CPI, ouvre une enquête selon son pouvoir discrétionnaire de le faire (art. 15 du Statut de Rome). Le Procureur devra donc évaluer le sérieux de la preuve, et s’il est d’avis qu’il dispose de bases raisonnables pour ouvrir l’enquête, il devra demander une autorisation de la Chambre préliminaire. Celle-ci se prononcera également sur la base raisonnable de la demande.

Les violations auxquelles il réfère sont traduites par Global Voices, un blogue francophone : « Nous réclamons que la Cour enquête sur les disparitions, le recrutement d’enfants de moins de 15 ans, sur les exécutions sommaires opérées par des soldats, sur la mutilation en tant que forme d’intimidation, sur les attaques perpétrées contre la population civile, sur les déplacements…

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Depoliticizing international criminal law

Realists frequently challenge the legitimacy of public international law as a bona fide legal discipline, contending that it is merely a political tool wielded by powerful states to enforce their diktats on the third-world. To Louis Henkin, “law is politics;”[1] elaborating on that theme, John Austin posited that international law is not really “law” because breaches do not engender legally-enforceable sanctions.[2] Such positions merit due attention, as they pose a serious challenge to efforts to promote adherence to international legal norms.

To respond effectively to Austin and Henkin, it is necessary to consider not only whether international law is possessed of “teeth”, but also the extent to which these teeth operate consistently and independently of political intervention. I will focus here on what I consider to be the two most significant developments in international criminal law over the last two decades: the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) through the Rome Statute of 1999, and the rise and fall of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction across various national legal systems. In many respects, both appear to have been rather successful in promoting individual accountability. For the first time, there exists a permanent and independent entity at the global level capable of prosecuting individuals charged with grave violations of international humanitarian law. Similarly, at the national level, many individual states have begun asserting the authority to prosecute such…

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“Mapiripán Massacre Scandal” Affair

A scandal happened recently relating to an Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) case, raising interesting issues of lawyers’ ethics, among others. Here is a summary of the facts drafted by Lawyers Without Borders Canada (LWBC), coming from the statement they have made concerning the recent events.

“A recent testimony of Ms. Mariela Contreras is at the root of the present affair. Ms. Contreras declared before the Colombian justice system in 2002, and before the Inter- American Court on Human Rights (IACHR), in 2005, that she had lost her husband and two sons in the massacre perpetrated by paramilitaries in July 1997 in the village of Mapiripán, with the complicity of regular military forces. On October 25th, 2011, she testified at Court that she had in fact lied and fraudulently benefited from the monetary compensation paid by the Colombian State as a result of the historical ruling in this case.”[i]

LWBC has not been personally involved in the case, so critics were not aimed at the organization in particular. LWBC is however closely linked to the Colectivo de abogados « José Alvéar Restrepo » (CAJAR), with whom they are partners in several projects. CAJAR is a Colombian human rights law firm, and they were representing some victims in the Mapiripan case in front of the IACHR, Ms. Mariela Contreras being one of those alleged victims. LWBC has thus expressed…

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On tuna, dolphins and all sorts of barriers

Trade lawyers’ interest in tuna and dolphins began in the early 1990s, when Mexico threw the first punch in what later became the long saga (going on 20 years now) known today as the tuna-dolphin disputes. The battleground was (and still is) the waters of the Eastern Tropical Pacific (“ETP”) Ocean, extending from California in the north to Chile in the south and Hawaii in the west. These waters are known for their abundance of sea-life, including numerous types of fish, dolphins, sharks, whales and sea turtles. Where fish are plentiful usually fisheries arise, and economic interests enter the game. This short note is written following the latest of a line of trade disputes between the United States and other states (most notably Mexico) concerning fisheries, morals and influence.

The tuna-dolphin disputes revolve around unilateral measures taken by the United States in order to combat the use of purse-seine fishing nets. Purse-seine fishing nets are used for commercial fishing. When used for tuna harvesting, not only tuna but also dolphins (and other species as well) are often trapped, injured, and even killed. It was argued by the United States that due to the use of these nets, the population of dolphins at the ETP was dramatically reduced.

Luckily for the dolphins, two types of U.S. pressure groups did not intend to let them disappear from the waters of the ETP.…

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Les droits de la personne sont-ils vraiment un “concept occidental”?

Les droits de la personne sont-ils seulement une expression moderne des ambitions impérialistes de l’Occident? Sont-ils une façon détournée de permettre aux pays occidentaux d’imposer leurs valeurs et leurs perceptions ? Devrait-on s’en méfier comme des représentants du néo-colonialisme? Manquent-ils de légitimité?

Je ne remets pas en question que l’application des droits de la personne puisse soulever des discussions et des désaccords. Je crois qu’il va sans dire que le concept de « liberté » ne représente pas exactement la même chose pour tous les habitants de la planète. Par contre, est-ce que quelqu’un s’est déjà prononcé contre la liberté? …Et si quelqu’un le faisait n’userait-il pas pour ce faire de sa liberté d’expression?  Les droits de la personne ne sont pas que des concepts juridiques, ils représentent des réalités bien concrètes.

Sans s’étendre dans l’analyse de chaque « droit », il est préférable de tenter de circonscrire le débat aux droits fondamentaux, aux droits qui peuvent trouver une représentation ou une autre dans diverses cultures, mais qui demeurent présents dans les systèmes de valeurs. Pour partir de droits très généraux, voici ma liste[1] : la liberté, l’intégrité, la dignité, la vie. Ces droits en englobent de nombreux autres, mais leur interprétation dépendra des choix culturels.

Il est important de revenir à l’objectif fondamental des droits de la personne : assurer un respect à la dignité de chaque être humain, donner une valeur juridique…

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Le bouclier humain volontaire en droit international humanitaire : un sujet controversé

En droit international humanitaire (DIH), autant dans une situation de conflit armé international (CAI) que dans une situation de conflit armé non international (CANI), il existe une prohibition absolue de faire usage d’un bouclier humain[1]. Le fait de placer des civils à proximité d’objectifs militaires afin de dissuader une attaque ennemie constitue un crime de guerre[2].  L’état du droit est à ce sujet sans équivoque.  Le DIH n’a cependant pas envisagé explicitement le phénomène des boucliers humains volontaires (BHV).  La présence de ce type de bouclier fut décelée dans un grand nombre de conflits armés actuels.  Cette nouvelle pratique entraîne une question à laquelle le DIH se doit d’apporter une réponse.  Il est en effet essentiel de déterminer si les individus formant un BHV conservent la protection habituellement attribuée aux civils.

À ce sujet, la doctrine est déchirée entre deux positions aux antipodes.  Le débat porte principalement sur la notion de participation directe aux hostilités.  En DIH, lorsqu’un civil prend directement part aux hostilités, il perd la protection à laquelle il a habituellement droit pour le moment de sa participation.  Le  parti menant l’attaque n’est plus tenu de le  prendre en compte dans la colonne des dommages collatéraux lorsqu’il évalue si l’offensive militaire respecte le principe de proportionnalité.  La notion de participation directe aux hostilités fait partie du droit coutumier dans les situations de CAI et de CANI

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Fragmented Laws, but Estranged? Belligerent Occupation, International Human Rights Law and Legislative Reform

Are belligerent occupants, under international law, permitted (or perhaps even required), to uphold the human rights of persons residing in occupied territories? The law of belligerent occupation itself – that body of law governing invader-states’ exercise of military control over a territory and its provisional administration – appears antiquated. Speaking broadly, this law posits a preservationist imperative[1] that requires occupants to respect and maintain the laws and institutions in force in the occupied state, subject only to a limited set of narrow exceptions.
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 thus provides that the occupier is obliged to ‘[prendre] toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui en vue de rétablir et d’assurer, autant qu’il est possible, l’ordre et la vie publics en respectant, sauf empêchement absolu, les lois en vigueur dans le pays’ (the English version erroneously translates the words ‘vie publics’ as ‘safety’; a more accurate translation would be civil life). The younger article 64 of Geneva Convention IV specifies that an occupying power is allowed to ‘subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration’.[2]
A straight reading of these articles underscores one of

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The Killing of Gadaffi: the death of a tyrant or the death of a chance at justice?

Gadaffi is dead. Libya’s chief forensic pathologist confirmed in an autopsy that Gaddafi was killed by a single shot to the head.  A previous Legal Frontiers entry explored the question of whether Muammar Gadaffi was a legitimate military target. NATO forces acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, some argue using force under the guise of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 and UN Security Council Resolution 2009. As it turns out, NATO troops were not the ultimate armed force to capture and subsequently kill Gadaffi, but the rebel movement, with essential lethal backing from NATO.

Libya’s non-elected interim leaders of the National Transitional Council (NTC) have since officially declared the country’s ‘liberation’ following the death of Muammar Gaddafi and called for reconciliation after more than four decades under the autocratic leader. However, the issue that has emerged since Gadaffi’s death has been whether this ‘liberation’ was achieved in a just manner. This speaks to the ability of the new NTC government to have adhered to the standard of the rule of law. Furthermore, this is especially pertinent in the volatile post-conflict transitional period Libya is currently in where the NTC will now also have to deal with many Gadaffi loyalists.

Several African leaders, such as President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, have voiced their concerns that Gaddafi should “

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The duty to recognize Palestine

Last week, culminating two years of intensive state-building efforts, Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Mahmoud Abbas formally applied to the United Nations for the admission of the state of Palestine as its newest member. While the outcome and consequences of this controversial bid are yet to be seen, I wish here to consider its legal implications and particularly the third-party obligations to which it gives rise.

The international community has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to Palestinian self-determination. In general terms, its normative obligations to the Palestinian people can be divided into three categories. First, there is a moral duty, arising both from humanitarian interest and from the international community’s exceptionally pronounced role in the protracted conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, to advance peace and reconciliation between the two parties. Second, there is a general legal duty, stemming from the preambles of the UN Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to promote respect for the Palestinians’ human rights, which have been recognized as including the collective right to self-determination.[1] Third, there is a specific legal duty, rooted in the Geneva Conventions, to protect the rights of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation by ensuring Israeli compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL).

Effects of UN recognition on the parties’ compliance with international law

Israeli settlements in the West Bank, often built on stolen private land,[2] have…

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