Posts tagged ‘Libya’
The Killing of Gadaffi: the death of a tyrant or the death of a chance at justice?
Gadaffi is dead. Libya’s chief forensic pathologist confirmed in an autopsy that Gaddafi was killed by a single shot to the head. A previous Legal Frontiers entry explored the question of whether Muammar Gadaffi was a legitimate military target. NATO forces acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, some argue using force under the guise of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 and UN Security Council Resolution 2009. As it turns out, NATO troops were not the ultimate armed force to capture and subsequently kill Gadaffi, but the rebel movement, with essential lethal backing from NATO.
Libya’s non-elected interim leaders of the National Transitional Council (NTC) have since officially declared the country’s ‘liberation’ following the death of Muammar Gaddafi and called for reconciliation after more than four decades under the autocratic leader. However, the issue that has emerged since Gadaffi’s death has been whether this ‘liberation’ was achieved in a just manner. This speaks to the ability of the new NTC government to have adhered to the standard of the rule of law. Furthermore, this is especially pertinent in the volatile post-conflict transitional period Libya is currently in where the NTC will now also have to deal with many Gadaffi loyalists.
Several African leaders, such as President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, have voiced their concerns that Gaddafi should “
Sudan, Libya, and (Inter)national Criminal Punishment
At the national level, “courts and prosecutors are bound to serve the interests of society in general and, to some ambiguous and debated degree, the interests of victims.”[1] At the international level this complexity is even more pronounced, as at least one more injured party is introduced to the mix. By definition, the negative impact of international crime is felt not just by its immediate victims and the States in which it transpires, but also by the international community.
On 26 February 2011, the UN Security Council unanimously referred the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC).[2] Just under six years ago, the Security Council referred the situation in Sudan to the ICC.[3] Both referrals were made pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that is, in response to a threat to international peace and security.[4] Neither Libya nor Sudan are States Parties to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s foundational document, and both retain and use the death penalty as a mode of criminal punishment.[5]
Both States’ retention of the death penalty, far more remarkable today than it would have been years ago, is markedly at odds with the ICC’s relatively lenient sentencing scheme, whose most severe punishment is a term of life imprisonment,[6] to be served under conditions “consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing treatment…
Libya: Is Gaddafi a Legitimate military target?
The current escalating crisis in Libya has raised several international legal issues, namely the imposition of sanctions and most recently the implementation of the United Nations-mandated ‘no-fly zone’ over Libyan territory. However, a further legal question has arisen over the last couple of days. On Monday morning, the epicentre of Muammar Gaddafi’s compound in Tripoli lay in ruins as coalition forces continued their mission to weaken the Libyan leader’s military strength. This has given rise to what is probably the most controversial legal issue of the crisis: is Colonel Gaddafi a legitimate military target in the implementation of the no-fly zone? This debate circulates around the interpretation of the U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973) passed on March 17, 2011.
Firstly, enforcement action can be authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security. This is an exception to the prohibition of the threat or use of force in article 2(4) of the charter. The main issue surrounding the Security Council’s resolution is the scope of force and legitimate targets allied forces can use in protecting civilians and enforcing the no-fly zone.
The UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorises member states to take “all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country … while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any…
Domestic Implementations of the UN’s Financial Sanctions against the Libyan Regime
On February 26, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1970, which authorized, among other measures, an asset freeze against Muammar Gaddafi, his family, and certain members of the Libyan regime.
The Security Council passed the Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows the Security Council to issue binding decisions to maintain or restore international peace and security. Thus, member states are obliged to take domestic measures to implement the Resolution’s sanctions against the Libyan regime. This post provides a brief overview and comparison of the specific domestic initiatives that Canada, the UK, and the US have taken to implement UNSCR 1970 at a domestic level.
Canada
On February 27, one day after the passage of UNSCR 1970, Canada adopted Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolution on Libya and Taking Special Economic Measures. The Governor General made these regulations under the authority granted by the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA). The Special Economic Measures Act grants the Governor General the authority to make regulations to impose sanctions against a foreign state when Canada is obliged to through its membership in an international organization or when there is a threat to international peace and security.
United States
On February 25, one day prior to the passage of UNSCR 1970, Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13556 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya. Although the sanctions…
What’s next for Libyan Victims of Terrorism?
Readers of Opinio Juris may have seen Roger Alford’s recent piece discussing the apportionment of compensation funds among victims of Libyan terrorism. Victims and their families have retained Crowell & Moring to act against the Libyan government. Given the large number of victims, it was decided to appoint representatives to liaise between victims and the firm. The representatives signed a joint prosecution agreement (JPA), stipulating that compensation received by any signatory was to be shared by all signatories, according to an injury-type sliding scale and without regard for nationality.
A few years later, the U.S. government signed a compensation treaty with the Libyans, compensating only American victims. Crowell & Moring demanded that the funds obtained through the treaty should be shared with all victims of terrorism, including non-Americans, as per the JPA. Alford thinks it will be difficult for the non-Americans to argue that the JPA overrides the treaty as the agreement does not explicitly allocate funds obtained through diplomatic means. I bow to his superior knowledge of likely litigation outcomes – but am unsure that such a decision would be just.
The majority of victims of Libyan atrocities are non-American. Morally, they are as entitled to compensation as American victims. There is a possibility that other nations will not be as successful as the Americans in obtaining compensation for their victims. The Libyans have a strong incentive to…
