Last week, culminating two years of intensive state-building efforts, Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Mahmoud Abbas formally applied to the United Nations for the admission of the state of Palestine as its newest member. While the outcome and consequences of this controversial bid are yet to be seen, I wish here to consider its legal implications and particularly the third-party obligations to which it gives rise.
The international community has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to Palestinian self-determination. In general terms, its normative obligations to the Palestinian people can be divided into three categories. First, there is a moral duty, arising both from humanitarian interest and from the international community’s exceptionally pronounced role in the protracted conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, to advance peace and reconciliation between the two parties. Second, there is a general legal duty, stemming from the preambles of the UN Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to promote respect for the Palestinians’ human rights, which have been recognized as including the collective right to self-determination.[1] Third, there is a specific legal duty, rooted in the Geneva Conventions, to protect the rights of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation by ensuring Israeli compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL).
Effects of UN recognition on the parties’ compliance with international law
Israeli settlements in the West Bank, often built on stolen private land,[2] have…
On February 26, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1970, which authorized, among other measures, an asset freeze against Muammar Gaddafi, his family, and certain members of the Libyan regime.
The Security Council passed the Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows the Security Council to issue binding decisions to maintain or restore international peace and security. Thus, member states are obliged to take domestic measures to implement the Resolution’s sanctions against the Libyan regime. This post provides a brief overview and comparison of the specific domestic initiatives that Canada, the UK, and the US have taken to implement UNSCR 1970 at a domestic level.
Canada
On February 27, one day after the passage of UNSCR 1970, Canada adopted Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolution on Libya and Taking Special Economic Measures. The Governor General made these regulations under the authority granted by the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA). The Special Economic Measures Act grants the Governor General the authority to make regulations to impose sanctions against a foreign state when Canada is obliged to through its membership in an international organization or when there is a threat to international peace and security.
United States
On February 25, one day prior to the passage of UNSCR 1970, Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13556 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya. Although the sanctions…
Political tensions in Lebanon have risen dramatically of late, threatening to erupt yet again into an all-out conflagration between the Sunni-led March 14 alliance, which heads the government, and the pro-Syrian March 8 alliance, which includes Hezbollah. Following a Lebanese newspaper report earlier this month on a massive drill by Hezbollah forces simulating a takeover of the entire country, many analysts are fearful of a resumption of the 2008 clashes in which Hezbollah effectively seized military control of several Lebanese cities, including the capital, in a successful bid for increased political influence.
The current escalations relate to the investigation being carried out by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) into the 2005 assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri, who actively opposed the Syrian occupation of his country and had been contemplating a return to politics at the time of his death. His bloody assassination galvanized the nationalist, anti-Syrian movement in Lebanon, sparking massive public demonstrations and international outcry which led in a matter of weeks to the end of Syria’s 29-year occupation of the country. STL was established at the behest of the Lebanese government and pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1757, which referred to the assassination as a “terrorist crime.”
This is the first time an international tribunal of this kind has been set up to investigate and prosecute an act of terrorism.…
On October 31, 2001, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1325 (CSR 1325), a groundbreaking statement emphasizing the disproportionate affect of armed conflict on women and urging the incorporation of a “gender perspective” in conflict prevention and resolution. The resolution was a culmination of years of effort on the part of NGOs, activists, scholars, and bodies within the UN.
While this document is laudable in its recognition of the special needs of women during hostilities and the role they must play in levels of the peace process, the resolution is conspicuous in its lack of concrete plans or benchmarks against which progress can be measured, either by governments, NGOs, or the UN itself.
10 years after the adoption of what might be characterized as a largely aspirational resolution, how far has the world community come? To what extent has the UN itself taken to heart the very language and ideas it advances?
On many fronts, there is cause for optimism. Since November 2000, 100% of Security Council resolutions on Darfur, over 60% of resolutions on Chad and the Central African Republic, and half of resolutions on Sudan contain language consistent with the spirit and language of SCR 1325.[1] In Rwanda, 56% of MPs are women, far surpassing the 30% quota mandated in its post-genocide constitution.[2] This is heartening, especially given that sexual violence and conflict on the…
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Human Rights
Public International Law
Special Contribution
Lucie Lamarche, Centre de recherche et d’enseignement sur les droits de la personne, Université d’Ottawa
Les media canadiens s’en sont donnés à cœur joie lors de la récente défaite du Canada, aspirant encore une fois au titre de membre temporaire du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Quelques explications de cette défaite, qualifiée d’humiliante, ont dominé l’analyse : le support sans ambiguïté du Canada envers Israël; les reculs importants du Canada au titre de l’aide internationale, agrémentés d’un soupçon d’idéologie réactionnaire concernant le droit des femmes à la santé reproductive; le dossier des changements climatiques; la présence militaire du Canada en Afghanistan. Tout cela est sans doute vrai. Fait intéressant, le crescendo médiatique entourant cet épisode de la diplomatie secrète internationale n’a pas jugé opportun de demander aux collectivités de femmes leur opinion sur la question. La sécurité est l’affaire des hommes ! A cet égard, le Conseil de sécurité se garde bien pour sa part de donner suite aux recommandations d’expertes féministes et juristes (Anne Orford, notamment) qui militent en faveur de l’ouverture démocratique du Conseil de sécurité.
Personnellement, je n’ai aucun regret à l’issue de ce vote. Une attitude désinvolte ? Non. Une attitude calculée.
Je suis de celles qui croient que le Canada a joué un rôle important dans le colmatage (ce qui n’équivaut pas à une réforme) des penchants sexistes du concept de sécurité globale, pierre philosophale…
The Security Council’s ability to suspend ICC investigations destabilizes the necessary independence of the court. Through Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the SC moves the ICC beyond a legal ideal into a political reality where diplomatic peace and justice can sometimes conflict. For reasons laid out below, this legal/political tension suggests that Article 16 is a Jekyll and Hyde provision. To consider Article 16 as a positive aspect of the Rome Statute, its dual character must be monitored through a continuous case-by-case assessment. This article will consider the implications of Article 16 and the possible consequences arising from Resolution 1422.
Article 16 – On Compromise and Politics
Article 16 represents a compromise between the SC and the ICC. In its earlier form, Article 16 prevented the ICC from commencing a prosecution on any situation being dealt with by the SC unless the SC decided otherwise [here at 1509]. This broad provision would have jeopardized independence of the ICC and left it susceptible to the political motivations of the SC. Viewed through a lens of compromise, the current version of Article 16 is a more palatable alternative. It arguably strikes an essential balance between recognition of the Security Council’s primacy over international peace and security and the Court’s independence. While the article still alters the independence of the ICC, it allows for investigations to continue…
US State Department spokesperson, Ian Kelly has said, in response to the latest report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran’s nuclear program, that the report underscores Iran’s refusal to “comply fully with international nuclear obligations.” Kelly’s statement is a result of Iran’s latest skepticism to comply with an international agreement on the scrapping of its nuclear program. The latest Brussels meeting of UN Security Council members and Germany indicates a growing sense of despair by Western diplomats with Iran’s failure to give concessions on its nuclear proliferation program. The negotiations between the “Iran Six” (the US, Britain, China, France and Russia) as well as Germany is centered on a “freeze for freeze” agreement, according to which Iran would suspend its nuclear enrichment program in exchange for the UN Security Council weakening its economic sanctions. However, world powers are growing increasingly desperate with Iran’s failure to carry out its international legal obligations and might proceed to impose sanctions.
Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and as such is entitled to enrich uranium. The degree of enrichment is essential here. Low enriched uranium (LEO) is for use of fuel in an electricity generating plant. Medium enriched uranium is for production of medical isotopes, and more than 90 percent enrichment is for a bomb-grade fuel. Iran has so far manifested LEO at its Natanz nuclear plant. The…