Legal Pluralism – A Primer

A number of my previous blog postings made extensive reference to the buzzword “legal pluralism” which one finds abound in contemporary legal literature. Instances of legal pluralism can be found in the recent debate on faith-based arbitration in Ontario, in the Beth Din courts of New York, and in the family law structure of the Philippines.[1] A discussion on the very term “legal pluralism” is important so that its underlying assumptions can be uncovered and scrutinized rather than passing the relevant discussion unnoticed.

I. Defining Legal Pluralism

At its core, the concept of legal pluralism serves two purposes. The first purpose is to discredit the doctrine of legal centralism. Griffith’s seminal paper on legal pluralism defined the ideology of legal centralism as a claim that “law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions”.[2] The state thus holds a monopoly over the administration of law, and is the sole source of legitimizing authority as to what constitutes “law”. Legal centralism follows a liberal conception where “state institutions operate according to strict principles of equality and neutrality”,[3] based on the assumption that state law is logically coherent.[4] According to legal pluralists, legal centralism is conceptually parasitic to the development of descriptive theories of the law, since it establishes an a priori notion of the desirable state of affairs.[5] As its second…

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Does the Charter Follow the Flag? the Afghan Detainee Transfers Example

In 2007, Amnesty International Canada and the BC Civil Liberties Association brought an application for judicial review of the transfer of individuals detained by the Canadian Forces deployed in Afghanistan. This action arose from allegations that the Canadian Forces were not taking adequate precautions to ensure that individuals, whom the Canadian Forces captured in Afghanistan and transferred to the Afghan forces, were not being tortured. To support their application, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) applied to individuals detained by Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. Both the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal held that the Charter did not apply to the actions of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.

Having previously argued that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) should narrow its ruling in Hape, I was disappointed to learn that it turned down an opportunity to hear this case. In my last entry, I argued that when establishing whether the Charter applies overseas, the foreign state’s consent should only be the determinative factor where Canadian authorities or agents would be enforcing the Charter in that state. With all due respect to Mactavish J.’s efforts to navigate Hape’s legal labyrinth, the Federal Court’s decision in Amnesty International reveals the confusion resulting from Hape. This confusion stems from LeBel J.’s assertion that the extraterritorial application of the Charter necessarily entails an extraterritorial…

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Strange Things Done in the Midnight Sun

Most systems of property law, like exorcists, attach special importance to possession. Once someone is in possession of a given piece of property, it is usually a demanding process to have them removed by force of law (pro tip: try holy water). The same has historically been true in matters of international territorial sovereignty. More often than not, the country which simply takes possession of territory will win out over others which may have more legitimate claims. Yet how can a state “take possession” of land which is uninhabitable? It doesn’t take a Neil Armstrong to tell you that the answer is by planting flags.

For some reason Canada seems unwilling to practise flag-planting as much as other countries. Today we have the excuse that most of our flags are hanging over Olympic podiums. But this wasn’t always the case, and our nervousness about throwing flags around is putting our claims of Arctic sovereignty at risk. These claims are important, and could translate into tall cash, since shrinking ice coverage and advancing technology will make it more practical to extract resources such as oil and natural gas from the Arctic seabed in the future.

Don’t let the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) fool you into thinking that flag-planting isn’t a legal basis for an Arctic claim. According to Part VI of the UNCLOS, states have an exclusive right…

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Does the Charter Follow the Flag?

Photo by Sgt. Gerry Pilote

Lurking behind the Afghan detainee transfer scandal is the issue of whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) applies to government action that occurs outside of Canada. The Charter itself provides no definitive answer because it does not contain an express territorial limitation. Section 32(1)(a) of the Charter only stipulates that it applies to “the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament …”. Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in R. v. Hape, LeBel J. held that the extraterritorial application of the Charter is impossible without the consent of the foreign state (para. 85).[1] While I support the ruling in Hape, I believe that given the chance, the SCC should explicitly narrow this conclusion to situations where Canadian authorities or agents would be enforcing the Charter in a foreign state. Beyond a situation that demands extraterritorial enforcement, an interest analysis should replace consent as the determinative factor in the assessment of whether the Charter applies outside of Canada.

The primary limitation on the reach of the Charter is Canada’s obligation to respect the sovereignty of other states (Hape, para. 59). Sovereignty is perhaps best thought of as the supreme power of each state to exercise jurisdiction on its territory and over its inhabitants without interference. Three organizing forms of asserting jurisdiction guide LeBel J.’s analysis of when…

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